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I. Introduction 
The ongoing trade conflict between the U.S. and China over Chinese-
made solar panels could have serious ramifications on the future of solar 
energy and energy policy, especially here in California.  In recent years, 
California has become a leader in innovative energy policies.  California has 
retrenched their commitment to renewable energy and is planning the most 
ambitious renewable energy plan in America.  There is a fundamental 
tension between the goals of the U.S. and the goals of California.  On the 
one hand, America must look to protect American industries and American 
workers from the ill effects of artificially priced Chinese solar panels.  
However, on the other hand the availability of cheap solar energy will be an 
important component in California meeting its ambitious renewable energy 
targets.  
 This note gives a general overview of the global solar panel conflict in 
relation to U.S. and California energy policies, discusses the various issues 
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with the U.S. government’s current response, and provides Federal and 
California policy proposals to ensure that California can meet its renewable 
energy targets.  First, this note provides an overview of why solar energy is a 
desirable alternative energy source.  Second, this note discusses what 
caused the solar panel conflict between the U.S. and China.  Third, this 
discusses the U.S.’s response to the solar panel conflict and it’s inadequate.  
Fourth, this note discusses the impact that the U.S.’s solar panel response 
could have on California energy policies.  Fifth, this note outlines policy 
proposals that the U.S. can undertake to end the solar panel trade conflict 
with China.  These policy proposals include a bilateral agreement between 
the U.S. and China, increased use of the World Trade Organization dispute 
resolution process, and conclusion of the Trans Pacific Partnership.  Finally, 
this note outlines policy proposals that both the federal Government and 
California can undertake in order to help ensure that California is able to 
meet its ambitious renewable energy goals.  At the federal level these policy 
proposals include continued federal subsidies for solar energy, renewal of 
expired tax credit programs, direct grant programs, loan and loan guarantee 
programs, and research development programs.  At the state level these 
policy proposals include incentive programs and tax credit programs.  
II. An Overview of Solar Energy 
As the effects of global climate change become more widespread and 
apparent, a move away from traditional sources of energy, like oil and coal, 
is becoming the norm.  Renewable energies are becoming more 
commonplace and, as will be discussed below, are important aspects of 
California’s energy policies.  Solar energy in particular is a very recognizable 
renewable energy source, and is an important part of the overall strategies 
to combat global climate change. 
There are several reasons why solar energy is an attractive option as an 
energy source.  First, solar energy is the most abundant energy source on 
the planet.1  Around 173,000 terawatts of solar energy continuously hits 
Earth; that is roughly 10,000 times the world’s total energy use.2  The 
second, and one of the most important reasons that solar energy is 
desirable, is that it generates electricity without producing greenhouse gas 
emissions or other forms of air pollution.3  For each kilowatt of “solar 
electric generating capacity, the pollution avoided by not using fossil 
 
1. Erin Pierce, Top 6 Things You Didn’t Know About Solar Energy (June 22, 
2012), http://energy.gov/articles/top-6-things-you-didnt-know-about-solar-
energy. 
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3. David Anderson, Solar Energy Benefits & Drawbacks, S.F. GATE, 
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/solar-energy-benefits-drawbacks-79613.html 
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fuels . . . amounts to . . . between 600 and 2,300 kilograms of carbon dioxide 
per year.”4  A home with a 2.5 kilowatt rooftop solar electric system offsets 
enough carbon dioxide “to equal that emitted by a typical family car during 
that same year.”5  Solar energy’s impressive ability to provide electricity 
without the devastating effects of carbon emissions makes apparent why 
improving current conditions for the solar industry is vital to combating 
climate change, and as discussed below, especially in California. 
III. Genesis of the U.S.-Chinese Solar Panel Trade Conflict 
One of the biggest issues with the consistency and availability of solar 
energy is the ongoing trade conflict with China.  This trade conflict centers 
around Chinese-made solar panels. In order to support their own solar 
panel industry, over the last few years China has heavily subsidized Chinese 
solar panel companies.6  As a result, the Chinese have been able to produce 
massive amounts of solar panels, driving prices down.7  According to some 
reports, cheap Chinese solar panel prices have gone down two-thirds since 
2010.8  The U.S. (and the European Union) accused the Chinese government 
of violating international trade law by “dumping” solar panels on the 
market.9  
“Dumping” is essentially when an actor sells a product on the open 
market below fair market rates in order to undercut prices and increase 
market share.10  The U.S. claims that as a result of illegal Chinese “dumping” 
American solar companies are being hurt and some are even going out of 
business.11  The well-documented failure of Solyndra, for example, resulted 
from Solyndra being unable to develop a viable business model around their 
solar panel technology resulting less sophisticated and cheaper Chinese 
solar panels flooding the market.12 
 
4. Better Building Series, “Myths about Solar Electricity” (January 
2003). 
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http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116286/solar-panel-trade-war-china. 
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11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/business/global/us-places-tar 
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8. Cassandra Sweet, Tariffs Boost Solar-Panel Makers in US (July 25, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/tariffs-boost-solar-panel-makers-in-u-s-14063 
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As a result of the accusations, the U.S. faces increased pressure to take 
action and protect American businesses.  This pressure culminated in the 
2011 Solarworld Case.  On October 19, 2011, Solar World Industries America 
filed a petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) for a 
preliminary antidumping duty determination regarding crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic (“CSPV”) cells and modules from China.13  The parties opposing 
the petition included The Chinese Chamber of Commerce for Import and 
Export Machinery and Electronic Products; Sun Edition LLC, a U.S. 
purchaser of CSPV cells and modules; SunTech Power Holdings, a Chinese 
producer of CSPV cells; Trina Solar, Inc., a U.S. distributor of photovoltaic 
(“PV”) products; and Solar Solutions, Inc., a U.S. distributor of PV products.14  
The ITC first had to determine what kind of solar cells were part of the 
domestic products being affected by the Chinese solar cells.  The ITC had to 
determine whether thin-film PV cells should be included in the definition of 
a domestic product like CSPV cells and modules.15  The ITC ultimately 
determined that thin-film products were would not be included in the 
analysis because they were not similar enough to CSPV cells and modules.16 
Next, the ITC had to determine whether the domestic products of 
American CSPV producers made up a major portion of the total domestic 
production of solar products. The ITC determined that the domestic 
products of American CSPV producers made up a major portion of the total 
domestic production of solar products, and defined the domestic industry as 
all U.S. producers of CSPV cells and modules.17  The ITC concluded that 
there is “a causal nexus between the subject imports and the declines in the 
condition of the domestic industry and thus demonstrates a reasonable 
indication of material injury by reason of subject imports.”18  The ITC is 
required to impose tariffs on the subject import upon making an affirmative 
determination.19 
The ITC, during antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, 
determines whether “there is a reasonable indication that that an industry in 
the U.S. is materially injured or threatened with material injury” by the 
 
13. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China, U.S. 
International Trade Commission, December 2011 at 3 [hereinafter 
Solarworld]. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 11-12. 
16. Id.  
17. Id. at 17. 
18. Id. at 30. 
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(e), 1673e(a). 
 




subject imports.20  In making this determination the ITC examines “the facts 
of record that relate to the significance of the volume and price effects of the 
subject imports and any impact of those imports on the condition of the 
domestic industry.”21  Ultimately, after their investigation, the ITC 
determined that the domestic industry was materially injured by the subject 
imports, but not to the point that retroactive tariffs were necessary.22   
As a result of the ITC’s findings, the U.S. instituted anti-dumping tariffs 
to combat the low prices of Chinese solar panels.23  An anti-dumping tariff is 
a duty placed on a suspiciously low-priced import.24  This type of duty 
increases the price of the import in order to protect local markets from 
unfair competition.25  The U.S. anti-dumping tariffs imposed duties of 
between nineteen percent and thirty-five percent.26 
IV. International Free Trade and Other Arguments Against 
Trade Tariffs 
The purpose of anti-dumping tariffs is to protect local producers, in 
this situation, American solar panel producers.  However, there are several 
reasons why tariffs are not an appropriate response to resolve the on-going 
conflict between the U.S. and China.  First, tariffs are an impediment to 
international free trade.  Second, tariffs are ineffective.  And third, cheap 
Chinese solar panels are a good thing for the American and Californian solar 
panel market.  
The first reason tariffs are not the ideal method of addressing this 
problem is because they impede free trade.  International trade has helped 
fuel economic growth in the developed world over the last few decades.27  In 
recent years trade advocates have advocated for more liberal free trade, the 
idea being that trade should have few barriers.28  These advocates argue that 
liberal free trade enhances geopolitical stability, promotes the efficient use 
 
20. Solarworld, supra note 13 at 17 (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(b), 
1673b(a)). 
21. Id. at 17. 
22. Id. at 30. 
23. Diane Cardwell, U.S. Imposes Steep Tariffs on Importers of Chinese Solar 
Panels (June 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/energy-
environment/us-imposing-duties-on-some-chinese-solar-panels.html. 
24. BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definit 
ion/anti-dumping-duty.html. 
25. Id. 
26. Sweet, supra note 8. 
27. David Hunter, James Salzman, and Durwood Zaelke, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2011) at 1193. 
28. Id. 




of the world’s scarce resources and trade enhances communication and 
sharing of knowledge and technology.29  
 Liberal free trade enhances geopolitical stability by making countries 
like the U.S. and China economically interdependent.30  Countries that are 
economically interdependent are less likely to resolve conflicts through 
armed conflict.31  Liberal trade promotes the efficient use of scarce 
resources because it encourages nations to specialize the production of 
goods and services, ensuring that goods and services are produced 
efficiently.32  And liberal trade increases commercial transactions among 
different nations and theoretically stimulates the sharing of ideas, which 
should then stimulate technological developments.33  The promotion of 
liberal free trade allows all these positive things to occur.  
However, trade tariffs impede free trade because they distort the free 
market.  While protecting domestic solar panel producers is a noble idea it 
shouldn’t come at the expensive of free trade’s positive benefits.  Because 
trade tariffs would impede all the positive aspects of liberal free trade they 
are not appropriate. 
The second reason that the U.S. anti-dumping tariffs are not a 
desirable way to resolve the solar panel conflict is because they are 
ineffective.  First, trade tariffs are ineffective because the Chinese have 
previously found loopholes around the tariffs.  In 2012, in order to combat 
the increase in Chinese solar panels the U.S. placed tariffs on imported 
panels made from Chinese solar cells.34  Chinese companies were able to 
find a loophole by assembling panels with solar cells produced in other 
countries, like Taiwan.35  This loophole allowed Chinese companies to keep 
exporting solar panels without being subject to American trade tariffs.36 
Second, trade tariffs are ineffective because the Chinese government 
has retaliated with their own tariffs.  A key component of producing solar 
panels is a material called polysilicon.37  The U.S. is a large producer and 
exporter of polysilicon.38  In response to the U.S.’ tariffs on solar panels the 
Chinese government placed tariffs on U.S. polysilicon.39  In other words, the 
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U.S.’s decision to place tariffs on Chinese solar panels backfired.  Meaning, 
not only are the tariffs on Chinese solar panels essentially ineffective but 
also the Chinese have retaliated with their own tariffs.  The purpose of the 
trade tariffs is to protect American solar panel companies.  While they have 
helped American solar panel companies40 it has come at the expense of 
polysilicon producers. 
The third reason that trade tariffs are not the most effective way to 
resolve the conflict between the U.S. and China is because low solar panel 
prices are good for many in the American solar panel market. While low-
priced Chinese solar panels are hurting American solar panels companies, 
they are also a boon to another important aspect of the solar industry: solar 
providers, solar installers, and consumers. 
The demand for solar energy has increased over the last several years 
to the point that the U.S. has become the third largest market for solar 
energy.41  The annual installation of solar energy systems has increased in 
the U.S. from 1.265 gigawatts in 2008 to 4.75 gigawatts in 2013.42  With 
demand booming it is important for domestic solar energy installers to have 
access to cheap solar panels in order to keep their own rates low.  As 
discussed in more detail below, this is increasingly important states like 
California, which are trying to increase their renewable energy portfolio and 
solar energy in an important part of a balanced renewable energy plan.   
V. International Aversion to Trade Tariffs 
Before delving into the possible solutions to resolve the solar trade 
conflict between the U.S. and China it is important to discuss other 
international players that are dealing with the issue of Chinese-made solar 
panels as well, specifically the European Union and India.  The purpose of 
this section is to demonstrate that this conflict is not an isolated U.S.-
Chinese problem and further demonstrate that trade tariffs are not an 
appropriate solution.  
Like the U.S., the EU had problems with Chinese-made solar panels 
hurting European companies.43  The EU claimed that low price Chinese solar 
panels could result in cutting 25,000 solar industry jobs in Europe.44  And 
 
40. Sweet, supra note 8. 
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44. Ian Traynor and Jennifer Rankin, EU to impose anti-dumping tariffs on 
Chinese solar panels GUARDIAN (June 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
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like the U.S., the EU tried to resolve these issues through trade tariffs.45  
However, unlike the U.S., the EU and China came to a compromise.46  Under 
an agreement between the EU and China, Chinese solar panel companies 
agreed to a price floor and specific volume ceiling.47  This deal is not a 
permanent fix since the settlement will only run through 2015.48  However, 
this illustrates that a compromise can be struck with China.  The EU 
probably recognized that tariffs on Chinese-made solar panels would result 
in conflict and trade retaliation from China.49  This furthers the idea that 
trade tariffs are not the best solution for resolving this trade dispute with 
China. 
The other country dealing with cheap Chinese-made solar panels is 
India.  India is one of the fastest developing countries in the world and as a 
consequence, they use tremendous amounts of energy.50  India’s Prime 
Minister, Narendra Modi is making a push to increase the amount of 
renewable energy, particularly solar energy, which India produces.51  
Because of cheap Chinese solar panels, India mulled anti-dumping tariffs to 
protect Indian solar companies.52  India’s Finance Ministry ultimately 
decided not to pursue anti-dumping tariffs because domestic producers 
would not be able to meet the demand of India’s ambitious solar energy 
goals.53  
This example further demonstrates that trade tariffs do not need to be 
established.  The U.S. like India is increasing its demand for solar energy.  
India is choosing to protect consumers and increase their renewable energy 
supply rather than protect domestic solar panel producers.  This balancing 
of values is an approach that the U.S. can take. 
VI. Trade Tariffs Could Impede California’s Energy Policies 
As discussed briefly in above sections, one of the principle reasons 
that the U.S. should not use trade tariffs against Chinese-made solar panels 
 
45. Id. 
46. Ball, supra note 6. 
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49. Traynor and Rankin, supra note 44. 
50. Damian Carrington, Can Narendra Modi bring the solar power revolution to 
India? GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment 
/2014/sep/30/-sp-narendra-modi-india-solar-renewables-energy. 
51. Id.  
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is that cheap solar panels are an important part of the solar installation 
industry.  This is especially true in California, which has one of the most 
ambitious renewable energy plans in the U.S.  
Under the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, better 
known as AB32, California established a comprehensive blueprint for 
tackling the issue of climate change in the state.54  These measures and 
strategies were released as part of the initial Scoping Plan, and California 
became the first state in the U.S. to have a comprehensive set of greenhouse 
gas emission reduction strategies that involved every sector of the 
economy.55  Part of that initial Scoping Plan was a target to increase the 
amount electricity generated from renewable sources to at least thirty-three 
percent of California’s electricity by the year 2020.56  
The initial Scoping Plan acknowledged that solar energy would be a 
component of increasing California’s renewables portfolio standard (“RPS”), 
the amount of California’s electricity that comes from renewable energy.57  
The initial Scoping Plan specifically discussed Governor Schwarzenegger’s 
Million Solar Roofs Program.58  The Program called for a goal of installing 
3,000 megawatts of new solar capacity by 2017.59  When the initial Scoping 
Plan was released these seemed like ambitious targets, especially related to 
the solar power.  
Then in 2011, Governor Brown signed a bill putting the 
recommendation of the initial scoping plan into force.60  The RPS program 
required California’s “investor-owned and publicly owned electric utilities, 
as well as other retail sellers of electricity” to provide thrity-three percent of 
their retail electricity with renewable energy by 2020.61  And as part of 
Governor Brown’s Clean Energy Jobs Plan, the Governor set aggressive 
targets of adding 8,000 megawatts of centralized, large renewable facilities, 
with 3,900 megawatts online as of May 2014.62  In addition, the Clean Energy 
Jobs Plan also set targets for 12,000 megawatts of “distributed renewable 
generation by 2020,” and as of May 2014 4,400 megawatts have already come 
online.63  
 
54. First Update to the Climate Change Scoping Plan, page 2 (May 
2014). 
55. Id. at 4. 
56. Climate Change Scoping Plan ES-3 (December 2008) 
57. Id. at 44-45. 
58. Id. at 53. 
59. Id. 
60. First Update to the Climate Change Scoping Plan 40 (May 2014). 








In 2013, California added over 2,600 megawatts of solar energy, 
including 300 megawatts in self-generation photovoltaic (“PV”).64  Solar PV 
programs are driving the self-generation installation in California.65  In 2006, 
Senate Bill 1 (“SB 1”), set a target for 3,000 megawatts of self-generation 
solar energy by 2017, and as of May 2014, 1,570 megawatts have been 
installed.66  Meeting the goals of AB32 has increased the need for solar 
panels and solar energy.  
California is currently on a pace to easily meet the thirty-three percent 
RPS targets laid out by Governor Brown in 2011.67  Southern California 
Edison purchased 21.6 percent of its retail energy from renewables in 2013, 
Pacific Gas & Electric purchased 23.8 percent of retail energy from 
renewables, and San Diego Gas & Electric purchased 23.6 percent of its 
retail energy from renewables.68  And based on contracts that PG&E and 
SDG&E have already signed, their renewable retail electricity purchases will 
hit 31.3 percent and 38.8 percent, respectively, by 2020.69 
The success in meeting the thirty-three percent RPS targets motivated 
Governor Brown to proposed raising the target RPS from thirty-three percent 
to fifty percent by 2030 in his 2015 inaugural address.70  Experts believe that 
raising the target from thirty-three percent to fifty percent will stimulate the 
renewable energy market.71  Since the state’s major utilities are on pace to 
meet their thirty-three percent goals by 2020, there hasn’t been as much 
pressure to add more clean power to the grid.72  This previous lack of 
pressure led to a slowdown in the development of solar projects in 
California.73  For example, in Riverside County, half a dozen large-scale solar 
projects have stalled for months or years, and their developers dropped 
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73. Sammy Roth, Solar Slowdown: Stalled Projects dot Desert Landscape, The 
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other projects all together.74  The Governor’s new goal of fifty percent 
renewables will increase the pressure and reverse the slowdown of solar 
projects in California. 
The California Legislature has followed Governor Brown’s lead with a 
series of legislative proposals aimed at achieving the Governor’s proposals.  
One of the proposals is SB 350 which calls for “a 50 percent reduction in 
petroleum use in cars and trucks, a 50 percent increase in energy efficiency 
in buildings, and a goal of 50 percent of state utilities’ power coming from 
renewable energy, all by 2030.”75  This essentially patterns the goals that 
were laid out by Governor Brown in his inaugural address of January 2015. 
With Governor Brown’s even more ambitious renewable energy goals 
for California the need for cheap solar panels is readily apparent. In order for 
California to meet these goals, the U.S.-China solar panel trade conflict will 
need to be resolved.  Continued use of trade tariffs could increase the price 
of solar panels in California and make California’s renewable energy goals 
more costly. 
 
VII. Resolving the U.S.-China Solar Trade Conflict through 
Bilateral Agreement 
 As demonstrated above, tariffs are not the best way to resolve the 
solar trade conflict between the U.S. and China.  And finding some kind of 
resolution to the solar trade conflict will be an essential part of California 
meeting its renewable energy goals.  There are different possible solutions 
to resolving the issue at the federal level.  One option would be for the U.S. 
to allow domestic solar panel industries to fail and get out of the business 
of solar panel production altogether.  A second option would be some kind 
of bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and China.  The latter is 
probably the most prudent option.  
The “pure” liberal free market solution would be for the U.S. to drop 
the tariffs and just let the American companies go out of business.  In a truly 
liberal free trade and free market system, the government shouldn’t 
intervene if a company can compete.  If American companies cannot 
compete with the price of Chinese solar panels then they should be allowed 
to go out of business.  This preserves the sanctity of the free market and the 
consumer benefits from the low cost of solar energy products.  And in the 
case of California, cheap solar panels would be available to consumers and 
will help California meet its renewable energy goals.   
 
74. Roth, supra note 68. 
75. Katie Valentine, California Lawmakers Introduce Major Package of Bills to 
Tackle Climate Change CLIMATE PROGRESS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://thinkprogress 
.org/climate/2015/02/11/3621740/california-climate-legislation/. 
 




This solution is probably more extreme than a bilateral agreement and 
carries many negative ramifications.  Specifically there would be intense, 
negative political ramifications.  Companies that went out of business and 
the people who lost their jobs would be able to put the blame squarely at 
the feet of the government’s inaction.  At a time when the economy is slowly 
recovering this could be seen as unnecessarily harsh action by the 
government.  While President Obama supports more liberalized free trade 
measures like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which will be discussed further 
below, Democrats, labor unions, and environmental groups oppose it.76  The 
friction between President Obama and his traditional allies demonstrates 
the political pitfalls of pursuing liberal free trade that could come at a cost 
to American workers.  
A second solution would be some kind of bi-lateral trade agreement 
between the U.S. and China.  It could possible take the form of the 
settlement between the European Union and China in which Chinese solar 
panel manufacturers would agree to price floors and volume ceilings.  This 
would enable American producers to stay somewhat competitive against the 
Chinese solar panels.  
Such an option was unfathomable years, even months ago.  China is 
one of the biggest contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions, 
accounting for approximately twenty-six percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions.77  The growth of the Chinese economy over the last several 
decades is well documented.78  However, this growth has come at great 
expense to the environment in China.  Problems such as smog in Beijing 
and other cities, badly polluted water and soil in the countryside persist.79  
Surprisingly, there has been recent progress between the U.S. and 
China in terms of environmental policy.  During his late 2014 visit to China, 
President Obama agreed to a climate change pact with Chinese President Xi 
 
76. David Nakamura, Obama Says he Willing to Defy Democrats on his 




77. 2015 Sustainable Energy in America Factbook, Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (February 2015). 
78. Xiaodong Zhu, Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 26, Number 4 at 104-105 (Fall 
2012). 








Jinping.80  The agreement seeks to curb greenhouse gas emissions in both 
countries over the next two decades.81  The agreement shows that there can 
be cooperation between the U.S. and China.  And if these two countries can 
work on the broad strokes of an agreement to combat such a serious issues 
like global greenhouse gas emissions and climate change then it is possible 
for the two countries to come together on the issue of solar panels. 
There are many possible forms that a bilateral agreement between the 
U.S. and China could take.  The Solar Energy Industries Association, an 
American trade association, has produced a draft of an agreement that 
would be even more comprehensive than what the EU did and could help 
resolve larger issues in the solar panel industry.  Under SEIA’s plan, the US 
and China would remove any trade tariffs targeted against one another.82  
The plan also calls for the establishment of a “Solar Manufacturing 
Settlement Fund.”83  Essentially China would pay money into a fund that 
would help American companies hurt by the solar panel trade conflict.84  In 
exchange, the U.S. would drop all judicial or regulatory actions against 
Chinese solar panel companies.85 
A final aspect of the SEIA plan would be the establishment of a “Solar 
Development Institute.”86  One of the concerns about cheap Chinese solar 
panels is that they are not the best available technology.87  Chinese 
companies were able to produce such large amounts of solar panels at low 
prices that American companies, whose technology was presumably better 
but more expensive, were unable to compete.88  The American and Chinese 
governments would kick in money to establish a Solar Development 
Institute, which would be an American-based think tank.89  The think tank 
would serve as a vehicle to develop solar energy policies and technologies 
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to prevent another trade conflict from arising and to improve solar panel 
technology worldwide.90  
Some kind of bilateral agreement, like the EU-China settlement or the 
SEIA plan is probably the best course of action for the U.S. and China to 
take.  It allows all the parties involved to reach a compromise that bolsters 
the solar panel industries of both countries.  And the SEIA’s proposed Solar 
Development Institute encourages a sense of cooperation that could help 
prevent future conflicts and serve as a model for other kinds of trade 
disputes. 
VIII. Other Board Trade Strategies the U.S. Could 
Implement 
Apart from pure free market solutions or a bi-lateral agreement 
between the U.S. and China, there are several boarder trade strategies that 
the U.S. could take to combat trade issues with China; these trade strategies 
could be useful to solar panel trade. 
One strategy is increased use of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
dispute resolution process.91  The U.S. has a successfully used the WTO’s 
dispute processes in order to compel China to eliminate practices that 
violate WTO rules.92  As of March 2015, the U.S. has initiated sixteen WTO 
disputes against China.93  By maximizing trade enforcement resources, the 
U.S. can challenge Chinese trade practices that are “systemic and have the 
greatest economic impact.”94  This can include filing disputes against 
Chinese subsidies to Chinese solar companies. 
This first trade strategy might result in push back from China, as China 
could try to use WTO rules and disputes to undo WTO commitments or to 
“retaliate against its trading partners.”95  Ideally, the U.S. “will be able to 
convince China that these actions undercut [China’s] own credibility at the 
WTO.”96  However, the U.S. would need to communicate to China that the 
U.S. is prepared to respond to Chinese trade abuses by using the WTO 
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dispute procedures and other legal avenues.97  As one article puts it, 
“America will never be able to ‘out-protectionist’ China.  But [America] 
should make it clear that China will never ‘out-lawyer’ the U.S.”98   
This strategy could be effective since the U.S. would be using the 
current legal and trade frameworks rather than other more extreme political 
or economic measures, like trade tariffs.  However, it is important to 
consider the antagonistic effects it could have on China.  With the U.S. trying 
to cultivate a stronger relationship with China, the U.S. must be prepared to 
use the disputes measures available but must also keep an eye towards 
maintaining a good relationship with China.  
Another overall trade strategy that the U.S. could try to use is to 
continue working with other trading partners.99  In particular the U.S.’s 
international trade interests could be well served by the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”) deal.100   
The Trans Pacific Partnership is a proposed Asia-Pacific trade 
agreement, currently being negotiated between twelve countries.101  These 
countries are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.102  The large and growing Asia-
Pacific markets are “key destinations for U.S. manufactured goods, 
agricultural products, and services suppliers.”103  U.S. goods exports to TPP 
countries totaled $698 billion in 2013 and represented 44 percent of the 
total U.S. goods exports.104   
The U.S. could use the TPP’s leverage to obtain “real and measurable 
trade reforms from potential new members” like China, and seek to expand, 
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European Union.105  Through these efforts the U.S. can “create international 
leverage against China’s more restrictive trade policies. . . .”106  
However, the U.S. must be wary not to overly antagonize China.  
Working with the Asia-Pacific countries under the banner of the TPP can be 
used as a carrot for China, rather than a stick.  The U.S. and other TPP 
countries could allow China to join the TPP in exchange for China becoming 
“more fully committed to removing unfair barriers to trade.”107 
IX. Current Federal Policies to Help Solar Energy 
Consumers and Developers 
It would benefit the American solar industry for the federal 
government to either reach a bilateral agreement with China or use current 
international frameworks to force China to promote more fair trade 
practices.  However, given the current political climate it will be hard to 
reach those kinds of agreements at the present time.108  This section will 
outline current policies the federal government is taking to bolster the solar 
industry, and discusses ways that some of these policies can be improved.  
One of the strategies that the federal government is currently 
employing to bolster the domestic solar industry is the use of subsidies.  
Federal subsides for solar energy have had an uneven history in the United 
States.  The federal government has been providing direct support for solar 
manufacturing since the Carter administration.109  The Energy Tax Act of 
1978 provided tax credits to homeowners who invested in solar, and the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act “required utilities to purchase power 
from qualified renewable power facilities.”110  Despite these programs, 
production of solar power remained small.111  In fact, by the mid-1980s, 
domestic PV manufacturers were selling products at a loss.112  Solar 
manufacturing slumped even further when the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
reduced the Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”)113 to ten percent in 1988.114  
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However, in 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act.115  The 
Energy Policy Act included a thirty-percent ITC for “property owners who 
installed commercial and residential solar energy systems.”116 
The current residential ITC is one of the most well known solar 
subsidies available.  The tax credit initially applied to residential solar-
electric systems, solar water heating systems, and fuel cells.117  With The 
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 the tax credit was extended to 
include small wind-energy systems and geothermal heat pumps (effective 
January 1, 2008).118  In addition to being extended, a $2,000 credit limit was 
removed for solar-electric systems beginning in 2009.119  Under the ITC, a 
taxpayer may claim a credit of thirty percent of “qualified expenditures for a 
system that serves a dwelling unit located in the United States that is owned 
and used as a residence by the taxpayer.”120  The expenditures can include 
labor costs, assembly, or original system installation for the piping or wiring 
to interconnect the system to the home.121   
Another important tax credit similar to the residential ITC is the 
business energy investment tax credit.  The business ITC provides a credit 
equal to thirty percent of expenditures and has no maximum credit or cap.122  
Eligible solar energy equipment includes equipment that uses solar energy 
to generate electricity; to heat, cool, or provide hot water for use in a 
structure; or to provide “process heat.”123  Hybrid solar lighting systems, 
which use solar energy to illuminate the inside of a structure using fiber-
optic distributed sunlight, are eligible as well.124  The goal of both the 
residential ITC and the business ITC is to be a “stable, multi-year 
incentive . . . to encourage private sector investment in solar manufacturing 
and solar project construction.”125 
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Both the residential ITC and the business ITC were renewed for eight 
years under The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008.126  Both of these 
tax credits are set to expire at the end of 2016.  And in the case of the 
business ITC, the credit will reduce from thirty percent to ten percent.127  
Renewal of the two tax credits could be one of the ways that the federal 
government can assist the domestic solar industry, especially in light of the 
ongoing trade dispute with China.  Also, the tax credits can help California 
residents and business with their solar energy demand while helping the 
state achieve its renewable energy goals.  However, with the Republican 
Party increasing their numbers in the House of Representatives, and taking 
control of the Senate, the renewal of the tax credits are not certain.128  Many 
Republicans have largely been against using incentives and taxpayer money 
to assist the development of renewable sources of energy.129  It will be worth 
monitoring over the next year and a half whether the Republican Congress 
will try and kill the tax credits, which many believe have been one the most 
important policy tools in driving the increase in solar installations.130 
Another important tool that was developed to boost the domestic 
solar energy industry was the Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit 
(“MTC”).  The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) included a 
competitive thirty-percent tax credit for expenditures on advanced energy 
manufacturing projects.131  Over 500 applications were submitted because 
the tax credit was capped at $2.3 billion.132  The Department of Energy and 
the Internal Revenue Service allocated the MTCs based on “a project’s 
commercial viability, job creation prospects, contribution toward 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and other factors.”133  The program 
reached its original cap in 2010, and MTCs were awarded to 183 renewable 
energy projects.134  Although the Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit 
reached its cap in 2010, not all the funds were distributed and “Phase II” of 
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the program was launched in order to utilize $150 million in tax credits that 
were not used by the previous awardees.135   
Renewing this type of tax credit, or instituting a similar tax credit, 
could be an effective means of increasing solar manufacturing. The tax credit 
was in extreme demand and competitive to obtain.136  An increase in 
domestic manufacturing has the benefit of promoting American job growth.  
One of the issues of competing with Chinese-made solar panels is that they 
are much cheaper than their American-made counterparts.  By giving 
domestic companies a tax credit, it can help to offset some of the costs of 
the solar panels that the company would pass on to the consumer.  
However, again, the current political climate may make it difficult to 
institute a new federal tax program to assist solar energy manufacturers.  
Apart from federal subsidies in the form of tax credits, federal aid can 
come in the form of grants, loans, and loan guarantee programs.137  A third 
policy tool that has been previously used at the federal level was the Section 
1603 Treasury Program.138  The Section 1603 Treasury Program was created 
in 2009, and allowed solar and other renewable energy developers to receive 
direct grants from the federal government in lieu of the investment tax 
credit.139  The program was instituted “in recognition of the desirability of 
tax incentive policies for renewable energy development and the fact that a 
weakened national economy would restrict the availability of the private 
sector tax equity that typically financed renewable energy projects.”140  
Under Section 1603, the federal government could give grants equal to thirty 
percent of a project’s costs directly to commercial solar property owners.141  
The program expired on September 30, 2011.142 
Instituting a direct grant program could be very effective at increasing 
the amount of innovation in the solar industry.  A direct grant program is 
better than tax credits because provides companies with direct infusions of 
cash that they can then use to hire more employees, or develop new 
technologies.  This type of program is probably the most controversial 
because the government would be providing direct funds to private 
companies at the expense of taxpayers.  As has been mentioned earlier, the 
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current political climate may make such a direct grant program impossible.  
Many Republicans in federal office are against the government using 
taxpayer funds to help the solar industry.143  While some might be able to 
support a program that is reducing the tax burden of companies and 
individuals, like the investment tax credits, they would be unlikely to 
support direct grants.144  While the direct grants to companies might be the 
simplest and easiest way the government can support the solar industry, it 
is probably the most unlikely policy proposal discussed in this note. 
Besides direct federal grants, support from the federal government has 
taken the form of loan and loan guarantee programs.  One of these programs 
was the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program (“LGP”).145  The LGP 
was created in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in order to overcome the 
challenges that renewable energy projects face in obtaining long-term 
financing.146  The financing challenge for many energy projects comes in the 
transition from research and development to commercial deployment.147  
Through the LGP, the Department of Energy “guarantees the debt of 
privately-held energy generation and manufacturing projects, guaranteeing 
to a private lender that if the defaults on a loan related to the project, the 
government will step in to repay the outstanding balance.”148   
The DOE administers two primary loan programs, the permanent 
Section 1703 LGP and the temporary Section 1705 LGP.149  The permanent 
Section 1703 LGP was introduced in 2005.150  It applies to projects that try to 
mitigate air pollutants and employ new or improved technology compared 
to commercial technologies.151  The temporary Section 1705 LGP was 
introduced in the ARRA “for [the] rapid deployment of renewable energy and 
electric power transmission projects [.]”152  The section 1705 Program 
provided almost $13.3 billion in loan guarantees for solar energy projects, 
with $1.3 billion going towards solar manufacturers and the remaining $12 
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billion going towards solar generation projects.153  The program expired on 
September 30, 2011.154 
Apart from the tax credits, direct grants, and loan programs, the 
federal government is also supporting the solar industry through the 
Department of Energy’s SunShot Initiative.  The SunShot Initiative “aims to 
reduce the price of solar energy systems by about 75% between 2010 and 
2020.”155  The program hopes that by achieving this target the unsubsidized 
cost of solar energy will become competitive with other types of energy 
sources and help pave the way “for rapid, large-scale adoption of solar 
electricity across the United States.156   
The program has had major effects on the state of the solar industry.  
At the end of 2014, the Department of Energy reported that because of the 
growth in solar development, the solar industry had progressed sixty percent 
of the way toward the 2020 goal.157  SunShot works towards meeting the 
2020 goal by promoting market competitiveness with “cost-based metrics,” 
assisting the spread of technology and innovation, and enabling growth in 
solar energy deployment.158  SunShot works in five areas of focus: PV, 
concentrating solar power (“CSP”), systems integration, technology to 
market, and soft costs.159 
In terms of PV and CSP, SunShot funding supports technology research 
and development that the Department of Energy believes has the potential 
to “yield significant cost reductions, efficiency improvements, and improved 
reliability standards.”160  The Department of Energy, in its 2014 SunShot 
Initiative Portfolio, discussed many of the different research projects that 
the SunShot program was funding.161  For example, research is being 
conducted at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Golden, 
Colorado, related to diversifying the materials base for thin film solar 
cells.162  The research is attempting to accelerate the development process 
of “individual materials and PV device prototypes.”163  The results of this 
research have the potential to expand the materials options for PV’s and 
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produce new, abundant thin film solar cells.164  The SunShot Initiative is 
spending millions of dollars funding dozens of these kinds of PV and CSP 
projects with the hope that there can be major, industry changing 
breakthroughs. 
In terms of systems integration, SunShot funding supports strategies 
to increase solar penetration into America’s electrical grid and assist with 
widespread solar development.165  These research projects include projects 
related to supporting the development of power electronics technologies to 
reduce installation time and improve energy yield,166 projects related to the 
development of open and “interoperable” communication constructs and 
systems,167 and projects related to supporting solar plant performance and 
reliability.168  And like the PV and CSP research projects, the 2014 Portfolio 
identified dozens of projects that are spending millions of dollars trying to 
improve the solar industry.  
In terms of “technology to market” programs, SunShot funding 
supports “commercialization, market readiness, and domestic 
manufacturing supply chains.”169  While many of the programs related to 
“technology to market” are research projects being conducted in universities 
(like the PV, CSP, and systems integrations projects), some are very 
different. For instance one of the major “technology to market” programs is 
the SunShot Incubator Program.170  The SunShot Incubator Program 
provides assistance to small businesses to overcome technological barriers 
and “de-risk their products and services” while at the same time encouraging 
private investment.171  The program focuses “on rapidly commercializing 
products and services with the potential to make solar more affordable.”172  
The 2014 Portfolio identified dozens of companies receiving funding from 
the SunShot Incubator Program and described the types of work these 
companies are doing to improve the solar industry. 
In addressing “soft costs” SunShot funding supports “market 
transparency, workforce training, location solutions, and process 
improvements to make solar deployment faster, easier, and cheaper.”173  The 
2014 Portfolio described the various programs that SunShot is undertaking 
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to improve the outlook in terms of the “soft costs”174 of solar energy.  These 
programs include working to empower state and local leaders to develop 
strategies and solutions to reduce the costs of solar energy175; policy 
stacking and foundational analysis projects that work to better inform 
policymakers at the state, local, and federal levels176; harnessing “Big Data” 
and using analytics to improve decision making177; and providing training to 
promote a high quality work force.178 
The collection of programs and funding projects in the SunShot 
Initiative demonstrates that the federal government is committed to 
ensuring that the solar industry in the United States is strong.  SunShot is a 
good example of how the federal government can seek to improve the 
domestic solar energy industry.  Of all the programs discussed, this may be 
the most effective because it is the least controversial.  It involves lots of 
research for improving technology, while at the same time trying to improve 
market conditions without necessarily distorting those markets in the same 
way that direct funding or tax credits do.  Continued successes via the 
SunShot program will be important in driving the solar industry while the 
trade conflict with China continues, especially until there is some kind of 
agreement in place.   
X. California State Policies to Increase Solar Energy  
 California has policies and programs in place to increase solar 
energy.  One of the major California programs geared towards increasing 
solar installations is the California Solar Initiative (“CSI”).  Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger passed the CSI in 2006 with the goal of reaching 1,950 
megawatts of installed solar capacity by the end of 2016.179  The CSI is 
overseen by the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) and 
provides incentives to customers in “investor-owned utility (“IOU”) 
territories …”180  These are customers in the territories of Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company (“PG&E”), Southern California Edison (“SCE”), and San 
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Diego Gas & Electric (“SDG&E”).181  The three major programs of the CSI are 
the general market (“GM”) program and the low-income residential incentive 
programs, the Multifamily Affordable Solar Housing (“MASH”) Program, and 
the Single Family Affordable Solar Homes (“SASH”) Program.182 
 The GM CSI program offers two types of incentives, Expected 
Performance Based Buydown (“EPBB”) and Performance Based Incentives 
(“PBI”).183  The EPBB incentives are paid based on “verified solar energy 
system characteristics such as location, system size, shading, and 
orientation.”184  The PBI incentive is a “flat cents-per-kWh payment for all 
output from a solar energy system over its five years of operation.”185   
 In terms of lower-income incentives, the MASH Program offers 
“incentives for solar energy installations on existing multifamily affordable 
housing that meets the definition of low-income residential housing” 
established in the California Public Utilities Code.186  The MASH Program 
had two tracks.187  Track 1 provided “fixed, up front, capacity-based EPBB 
incentives,” and proved so in demand that Track 2 was closed.188  The SASH 
Program provides “fully subsidized 1 kW solar energy systems to single-
family very low-income households and highly subsidized systems to other 
single-family low income households[.]”189 
 While the CSI is a successful program in terms of increasing the 
amount of solar installations, California is in a position to adopt more solar 
boosting programs.  The California government is very different than the 
federal government in terms of its commitment to renewable energy.  
Governor Brown does not face the same kind of ideological opposition as 
President Obama, with California’s Assembly and Senate firmly controlled 
by the Democratic Party.190  California is in a position to build on the 
success of the CSI and implement programs similar to those that have been 
passed on the federal level.   
 California should attempt to undertake investment tax credit 
programs that would provide a percent back to consumers and businesses 
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that install solar energy systems on their buildings.  This strategy could 
become an important one, especially if the Republican Congress does not 
extend the current federal ITC programs for solar.  California could also 
develop a program similar to the 1603 Treasury Program, and provide direct 
funds to companies that are in solar development.  Another possible 
program a state level version of the various loan guarantee programs that 
were established by the Department of Energy.  The strategy that is having 
effective results on the federal level is the SunShot Initiative.  Since 
California is a leader in the development of solar energy policies and 
technology, having a California version of SunShot could be an effective 
policy initiative.  By investing in research and development, and in small 
businesses, California could firmly cement its station as the world’s leader 
in solar technology development.  With the ability of the federal government 
to make progress towards a deal with China related to solar panels, 
California will need to use a whole gamut of strategies in order to mitigate 
the damage that is being done by the solar trade conflict.  This is especially 
true if California is going to meet its ambitious renewable energy goals.  
XI. Conclusion  
The ongoing trade conflict between the United States and China is an 
issue that not only affects the United States as a whole, but California in 
particular.  California has very ambitious, but attainable, renewable energy 
goals.  Solar energy is a necessary aspect of these goals.  In order for 
California to obtain the goals laid out by Governor Brown, the trade issue 
between the United States and China must be resolved.  And the conflict 
cannot be resolved through the use of trade tariffs.  Apart from tariffs, there 
are several strategies, such as collective international pressure or a bilateral 
agreement between the United States and China, which would help to 
resolve the conflict.  However, proponents of increasing solar energy must 
also be realistic and understand that other various factors, like political 
pressure, might not make those strategies viable.  If the trade conflict cannot 
be resolved, then California and its citizens must be prepared to use 
strategies to continue bolstering the solar industry.  There are a wide range 
of federal options, like the residential and business ITCs, that can help to 
ease the price of solar technology.  And there are broad frameworks, like the 
SunShot Initiative, that provide funding for research and business to 
develop the domestic solar industry.  California must embrace these federal 
strategies while developing its own strategies that are tailored to California’s 
needs and meet its own ambitious plans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
